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PHONEY BUSINESS: SUCCESSFUL CALLER 
ID SPOOFING REGULATION REQUIRES 
MORE THAN THE TRUTH IN CALLER ID 
ACT OF 2009 
Alicia Hatfield* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In 2008, Doug Bates had a terrifying experience when he was 
forced to defend his home against what he thought were prowlers.1 
After putting his two toddlers to sleep, he and his wife heard noises 
coming from their backyard.2 He grabbed a knife and faced the 
dark to defend his family.3 Once outside, he quickly found himself 
blinded by a spotlight and disoriented by a booming command to 
drop the knife from his hand.4 As he was tackled to the ground, he 
wondered what could possibly have caused a SWAT team to 
surround his home.5 The answer to that question was Randal Ellis.6 
                                                          
* J.D. Candidate, Brooklyn Law School, 2012; B.A., Philosophy, Brooklyn 
College, 2008. I would like to thank my family and friends for their love and 
encouragement, especially my husband. I would also like to thank the faculty of 
Brooklyn law school and the editors and staff of the Journal of Law and Policy 
for their efforts on this note, especially Lindsay Lieberman for our many 
meetings. A special thanks is due to Steven Helfont for his editing and advice. 
Finally, I would like to thank the practitioners who contributed to this note, 
Mark Del Bianco and Jerry Grant. 
1 Salvador Hernandez, Lake Forest Family Thankful ‘911’ Hacker Going to 
Prison, ORANGE CNTY. REG., Mar. 27, 2008, http://www.ocregister.com/news/ 
family-185237-bates-home.html.  
2 Id. 
3 Id.   
4 Id. 
5 See id. 
6 Hernandez, supra note 1.  
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Just moments before, Ellis placed a call to 911 with “spoofed” 
caller identification (“caller ID”) information, making the call 
appear to have originated from within Mr. Bates’ home, a practice 
known as “swatting.”7 After Ellis told the dispatcher that drugs led 
him to murder his sister, the SWAT team was deployed to Mr. 
Bates’ quiet California home.8 Fortunately, the SWAT team 
handled the situation with caution and no one was injured.9 While 
swatting is one of the many illegitimate uses of caller ID spoofing 
technology that has garnered significant media attention in recent 
years,10 there are many legitimate and socially desirable uses of the 
technology.11 Nonetheless, Congress introduced multiple anti-
caller ID spoofing bills beginning in 2006.12  
The Truth In Caller ID Act of 2009 (“TICIDA”), which 
outlaws the use of caller ID spoofing with intent “to defraud, cause 
harm, or wrongfully obtain anything of value,” was signed into law 
                                                          
7 SWAT Teams Deployed in 911 Telephone Fraud, MSNBC (Feb. 1, 2009, 
4:55 PM), http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/28965633/. 
8 See id. 
9 Hernandez, supra note 1. Ellis was sentenced to three years in prison. Id.  
10 See generally 152 CONG. REC. H3386, H3388 (daily ed. June 6, 2006) 
(statement of Rep. Engel). Most citizens trust the information displayed on 
caller ID devices since most remain unaware that caller ID spoofing technology 
exists. Id. 
11 See Part II.B.1 (describing the many legitimate uses of caller ID 
spoofing); see also 155 CONG. REC. S170, S17374 (daily ed. Jan. 7, 2009) 
(statement of Sen. Nelson) (highlighting various illegitimate and legitimate 
uses). 
12 See Truth in Caller ID Act of 2010, H.R. 1258, 111th Cong. (2010); 
Truth in Caller ID Act of 2009, S. 30, 111th Cong. (2009); Preventing 
Harassment Through Outbound Number Enforcement Act of 2009, H.R. 1110, 
111th Cong. (2009); Truth in Caller ID Act of 2007, S. 704, 110th Cong. (2008); 
Preventing Harassment Through Outbound Number Enforcement Act of 2007, 
H.R. 740, 110th Cong. (2007); Truth in Caller ID Act of 2007, H.R. 251, 110th 
Cong. (2007); Truth in Caller ID Act of 2006, S. 2630, 109th Cong. (2006); 
Preventing Harassment Through Outbound Number Enforcement Act, H.R. 
5304, 109th Cong. (2006); Truth in Caller ID Act of 2006, H.R. 5126, 109th 
Cong. (2006). Many states have also proposed or passed laws making the act of 
caller ID spoofing illegal. See generally Margaret Stolar & Chuck Gall, Bills 
Introduced to Battle Caller ID Spoofing, 13 CONSUMER FIN. SERVS. L. REP. 5 
(2009). 
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on December 22, 2010.13 However, successful caller ID spoofing 
regulation requires more than a statute outlawing illegitimate uses 
of the technology, most of which were already illegal under 
existing federal laws. It is imperative that the Department of 
Justice, the Federal Communications Commission (“FCC”), and 
Congress accomplish effective regulation of the industry to curb 
the nefarious aspects of spoofing and preserve legitimate uses. This 
Note argues that the TICIDA cannot successfully regulate the 
caller ID spoofing industry because the criminal penalties under 
the TICIDA are too minimal to deter most illegitimate users; the 
TICIDA does not expressly criminalize text message spoofing; and 
the TICIDA does not create comprehensive regulation of the caller 
ID spoofing industry. In order to maintain the availability of this 
technology for legitimate users,14 the Department of Justice should 
creatively and aggressively prosecute illegitimate users under 
alternative federal laws when doing so would result in greater 
deterrence. In addition, the FCC should request that Congress 
modify the TICIDA to define the term “call” as both voice and text 
calls expressly so that text message spoofing does not become a 
successor technology. Lastly, the FCC should promulgate 
regulations that facilitate the tracing of spoofed calls and create a 
Do-Not-Spoof list. Part II explains caller ID spoofing and 
highlights its most common legitimate and illegitimate uses. Part 
III analyzes state and federal attempts at anti-caller ID spoofing 
legislation. Part IV suggests steps the Department of Justice, the 
FCC, and Congress should take in order to maximize deterrence of 
illegitimate uses and create successful regulation of the caller ID 
spoofing industry. 
II. BACKGROUND 
A. What is Caller ID Spoofing? 
To understand how caller ID spoofing is accomplished, it is 
                                                          
13 Truth in Caller ID Act of 2009, S. 30, 111th Cong. (2009). 
14 See generally 156 CONG. REC. H2522 (daily ed. Apr. 14, 2010) 
(statement of Rep. Boucher) (explaining that the TICIDA is intended to outlaw 
nefarious uses but permit legitimate uses). 
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helpful to first understand traditional caller ID service. When a 
phone call is placed over the public switched telephone network15 
or on a cell phone, information about the phone call is sent along 
with the call itself to the called party.16 The calling party number 
(“CPN”), one type of data sent with the call, is a ten-digit number 
that identifies the phone number from which the call is being 
placed.17 If the called party subscribes to a caller ID service, the 
receiving phone company searches its records for the name that 
corresponds with the incoming CPN,18 and the caller ID device 
displays that information.19 If the caller blocks her caller ID 
information by dialing *67 before the called party’s number, the 
CPN will include a marker to communicate to the receiving phone 
company that the call is intended to be anonymous.20 In this case, 
the receiving phone company will not display the caller’s CPN 
information.21  
Another piece of information sent along with a phone call is 
the automatic number identification (“ANI”).22 The ANI also 
contains the ten-digit caller number; however, it is not used for 
caller ID purposes.23 This information is sent with the phone call 
regardless of whether the caller utilized *67 call blocking.24 The 
ANI enables premium phone services, such as 800 and 900 
numbers, to identify which telephone account to charge for 
                                                          
15 The public switched telephone network (“PSTN”), or the plain old 
telephone service, is the structure that transmits landline phone calls. HARRY 
NEWTON, NEWTON’S TELECOM DICTIONARY 667 (20th ed. 2004); see also 
David Roos, How Telephone Country Codes Work, HOWSTUFFWORKS, 
http://communication.howstuffworks.com/telephone-country-codes1.htm (last 
visited Feb. 4, 2011). 
16 47 C.F.R. § 64.1601(a) (2006). 
17 NEWTON, supra note 15, at 148. 
18 Ward Mundy, Asterisk Caller ID Perfected: Caller ID Superfecta 2.0, 
NERD VITTLES (May 11, 2009), http://nerdvittles.com/?p=609.  
19 How Does Caller ID Work?, HOWSTUFFWORKS, http://www.howstuff 
works.com/question409.htm (last visited Feb. 4, 2011).  
20 47 C.F.R. § 64.1601(b) (2006). 
21 Id. 
22 NEWTON, supra note 15, at 63. 
23 Id. at 147. 
24 Id. at 63. 
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incoming phone calls.25 When caller ID information is spoofed, 
both the ANI and the CPN are changed to a fake phone number.26 
1. Traditional Caller ID Spoofing 
Primitive forms of caller ID spoofing were possible if the 
spoofer had sufficient knowledge of the telephone system to 
manipulate the signals that communicate caller ID information to 
the caller ID device.27 The creation of voice over IP (“VoIP”) 
technology28 and the availability of web-based commercial 
spoofing companies has made caller ID spoofing more 
accessible.29 When spoofing is accomplished via a commercial 
spoofing company, the spoofer first pays for a block of minutes in 
advance to establish an account.30 To place a spoofed call, the 
spoofer either calls the company’s 800 number or visits its 
website.31 Next, the spoofer enters the number he is calling, 
followed by the number he would like displayed as the fake caller 
                                                          
25 Id. 
26 See The Truth in Caller ID Act: Hearing on H.R. 251 Before the 
Subcomm. on Telecomm. & the Internet of the H. Comm. on Energy & 
Commerce, 110th Cong. 25 (2007) [hereinafter Knight Statement] (statement of 
Allison Knight, Staff Counsel, Electronic Privacy Information Center). 
27 S. REP. NO. 110-234, at 2 (2007). Spoofers created false caller ID tones 
to trick the caller ID device via software or recording a caller ID signal they 
wished to emulate. AOH Staff & dethme0w, Orange Boxing/Caller ID Hacking 
FAQ, ART OF HACKING (Oct. 21, 2006), http://www.artofhacking.com/files/OB-
FAQ.HTM. 
28 Voice-Over-Internet Protocol, FED. COMM. COMM’N, http://www. 
fcc.gov/voip/ (last updated Feb. 1, 2010). VoIP is an alternative to traditional 
phone service that utilizes the Internet to place phone calls. Id. 
29 S. REP. NO. 110-234, at 2; see also Judy L. Thomas, ‘Spoofers’ 
Sidestepping Caller ID Raise Alarm, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Sept. 20, 2009, 
http://articles.orlandosentinel.com/2009-09-20/news/0909200100_1_caller-id-
called-spoofing-phone-calls (noting that the number one spoofing company, 
SpoofCard, has over three million customers). 
30 Frequently Asked Questions, SPOOFCARD, http://www.spoofcard.com/ 
faq (last visited Feb. 4, 2011). 
31 See SPOOFCARD, http://www.spoofcard.com/ (last visited Feb. 4, 2011) 
(enabling users to place spoofed phone calls from the main page of the website). 
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ID number.32 Depending on the service used, the spoofer may also 
have the option to record the call or to alter the sound of his 
voice.33 It is impossible to trace spoofed calls except by 
subpoenaing the spoofing company’s records to determine the 
identity of the customer.34  
Spoofing is also possible for individual users of VoIP 
services.35 VoIP technology utilizes a text-based method for 
initiating and ending a phone call, known as Session Initiation 
Protocol (“SIP”).36 Spoofing is accomplished when the spoofer 
uses software, often a program known as Asterisk, to alter his SIP 
information.37 Multiple websites provide step-by-step instructions 
for this process.38 Most VoIP providers prevent their users from 
altering their SIP information,39 but some providers do not secure 
their systems.40  
2. Text Message Caller ID Spoofing 
Text message spoofing takes place when a party changes the 
“from” information in a text message so that it appears that the text 
message was sent from a different telephone.41 In this way, text 
                                                          
32 Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 30. 
33 155 CONG. REC. S170, S173 (2009) (daily ed. Jan. 7, 2009) (statement of 
Sen. Nelson). 
34 Thomas, supra note 29. Spoofcard reports that it is highly cooperative 
with law enforcement efforts to stem illegal uses of the technology. Id.  
35 VonageTPA, Comment to Caller ID Spoofing, VONAGE VOIP F. (Mar. 2, 
2006, 12:35 AM), http://www.vonage-forum.com/ftopic11704.html.  
36 NEWTON, supra note 15, at 752. 
37 Mundy, supra note 18. 
38 VonageTPA, supra note 35; see also Reports: Automated Caller ID/ANI 
Spoofing, ROOTSECURE.NET (July 8, 2004), http://www.rootsecure.net/?p= 
reports/callerid_spoofing.  
39 See VonageTPA, supra note 35. Vonage is an example of a company that 
prevents users from altering SIP information. Id. 
40 Ward Mundy, Asterisk Caller ID on Steroids: Here’s How, NERD 
VITTLES (Feb. 9, 2006), http://nerdvittles.com/index.php?p=115 (claiming VoIP 
providers TelaSIP and Teliax are among the few that still allow caller ID 
manipulation).  
41 E-mail from Jerry Grant, JR Computer Consulting, to author (Sept. 19, 
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message spoofing is similar to caller ID spoofing, except that it 
affects mobile phones exclusively. Text message spoofing is 
usually accomplished through a text message spoofing website, 
often owned by the same companies that own caller ID spoofing 
websites.42 The only way to verify that the text message was 
spoofed is to look at the alleged sender’s phone records for the 
absence of the outgoing message.43  
B. Uses of Caller ID Spoofing 
Caller ID spoofing has many uses.44 Although some states’ 
approach to caller ID spoofing classifies all caller ID spoofing as 
illegitimate, Congress has recognized legitimate uses. The floor 
debates on the TICIDA evince a Congressional intent to secure the 
availability of the technology for legitimate users.45 This section 
discusses which uses Congress labeled as legitimate and 
illegitimate.  
1. Legitimate Uses of Caller ID Spoofing 
There are many legitimate users of caller ID spoofing, 
including business professionals who use the technology to prevent 
their personal numbers from becoming public and call centers that 
project incoming phone numbers on their outgoing lines.46 Doctors 
                                                          
2010, 9:11 AM) (on file with author). 
42 Id. 
43 Id. 
44 E.g., 153 CONG. REC. E1286 (daily ed. June 13, 2007) (statement of Rep. 
Green). 
45 See, e.g., 152 CONG. REC. H3386, H3387 (daily ed. June 6, 2006) 
(statement of Rep. Markey) (stating the importance of protecting legitimate 
uses); 156 CONG. REC. H2522, H2523 (daily ed. Apr. 14, 2010) (statement of 
Rep. Boucher) (asserting that domestic violence survivors do not intend to 
deceive when using caller ID technology, so their use would not be criminalized 
under H.R. 1258). 
46 See, e.g., 156 CONG. REC. H252224 (statement of Rep. Boucher); 152 
CONG. REC. H3386, H3387 (statement of Rep. Markey). By spoofing, 
telemarketing companies are able to provide the recipients of their calls with a 
viable return number. The Truth in Caller ID Act: Hearing on S. 704 Before the 
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and other professionals, who must make occasional phone calls 
from home, use the service to project their office numbers, 
informing their clients that they are calling while keeping their 
private numbers undisclosed.47 Teltech Systems, Inc. (“Teltech”)48 
reports that the service is also useful for journalists who want to 
keep their personal numbers private.49 Additional uses of caller ID 
spoofing include “seeking criminals who have jumped bail, 
tracking down child support payment deadbeats, . . . providing 
whistleblowers anonymity in making disclosures,”50 and 
facilitating debt collection.51 Even Congress members use the 
technology so that outgoing calls display the office’s main number 
instead of the numbers of their personal lines.52 
Arguably, the most socially valuable use of spoofing 
technology is to protect domestic violence shelters and victims, 
and this has long been a congressional priority when dealing with 
caller ID technology.53 In 1995, the FCC passed regulations 
requiring that individual users have the capability to block their 
                                                          
S. Comm. on Commerce, Sci., & Transp., 110th Cong. 5 (2007) [hereinafter 
Cerasale Statement] (statement of Jerry Cerasale, Senior Vice-President, Direct 
Marketing Association). If a consumer attempted to return a telemarketing call 
to an outgoing line, the number would be busy. Id. 
47 See, e.g., 153 CONG. REC. H6257, H6258 (daily ed. June 12, 2007) 
(statement of Rep. Markey); Cerasale Statement, supra note 46. 
48 Teltech is the parent company of SpoofCard, the largest caller ID 
spoofing company. Thomas, supra note 29. 
49 Plaintiff’s Statement of Material Facts in Support of Motion for 
Summary Judgment at 3, Teltech Sys., Inc. v. McCollum, No. 08-61664-CIV-
Martinez-Brown (S.D. Fla. 2009). 
50 Drew Douglas, Marketers Challenge Constitutionality of Florida’s 
Caller ID Spoofing Ban, 9 COMPUTER TECH. L. REP. (BNA) 550 (Nov. 7, 2008). 
The TICIDA contains a law enforcement exception, ensuring that law 
enforcement may legally continue to use caller ID spoofing. Truth in Caller ID 
Act of 2009, S. 30, 111th Cong. § 2(e)(3)(ii) (2009).  
51 The Truth in Caller ID Act: Hearing on S. 704 Before the S. Comm. on 
Commerce, Sci., & Transp., 110th Cong. 5 (2007) [hereinafter Monteith 
Statement] (statement of Kris Monteith, Chief of Enforcement Bureau, FCC). 
52 153 CONG. REC. H6257, H6258 (daily ed. June 12, 2007) (statement of 
Rep. Markey). 
53 See id. 
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personal information when making calls by dialing *67.54 Many 
states introduced regulations that required blocking options to be 
provided free of charge, partially out of concern for domestic 
violence victims.55 Thus, government officials have consistently 
tried to minimize the likelihood that caller ID could deliver the 
location of a domestic violence victim or shelter to her abuser.56 
By using caller ID spoofing, victims are able maintain contact with 
loved ones safely. 
2. Illegitimate Uses of Caller ID Spoofing 
Caller ID spoofing also has many nefarious uses.57 Proponents 
of caller ID spoofing legislation focused on particularly egregious 
examples of illegitimate uses during debates.58 This section 
discusses the four nefarious uses of spoofing technology most 
                                                          
54 47 C.F.R. § 64.1601(b) (2006).  
Carriers must arrange their CPN-based services, and billing practices, 
in such a manner that when a caller requests that the CPN not be 
passed, a carrier may not reveal that caller’s number or name, nor may 
the carrier use the number or name to allow the called party to contact 
the calling party.  
Id. 
55 Telephone Firms Give in on Caller-ID Blocking, NEWSDAY, Oct. 9, 
1990, at 41; see also Timothy C. Barmann, Cox Communications Cancels Plans 
to Charge for Privacy Service, PROVIDENCE J., Jan 9, 2001. 
56 See, e.g., Bob Wyss, Wires Crossed in Caller ID Blocks Phone 
Companies Promise Privacy, but Failures Abound, PROVIDENCE J., March 5, 
1995, at 1A; Telephone Firms Give in on Caller-ID Blocking, supra note 55. 
Opponents of caller ID forcefully argued that the service made customers 
vulnerable by releasing their private information without regard to whether the 
customer wanted to enroll in the service, and that this was particularly 
dangerous in the context of domestic violence shelters and victims. Telephone 
Firms Give in on Caller-ID Blocking, supra note 55. 
57 The Truth in Caller ID Act of 2006: Hearing H.R. 5126 Before the 
Subcomm. On Telecomms. & the Internet of the H. Comm. on Energy & 
Commerce, 109th Cong. 24 (2006) (statement of Lance James, Chief 
Technology Officer, Secure Science Corp.). It is estimated that in excess of 
seventy-five percent of spoofed calls are made for malicious purposes. Id. at 25. 
58 See, e.g., 156 CONG. REC. H2522–24 (daily ed. Apr. 14, 2010) (statement 
of Rep. Boucher). 
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often cited by proponents during debates on the TICIDA: fraud,59 
swatting,60 harassment,61 and political harassment.62  
i. Fraud 
Caller ID spoofing is used to perpetrate fraud in two ways: to 
make victims believe a spoofer is a trusted entity or to make a 
trusted entity believe a spoofer is his victim.63 In other words, 
caller ID spoofing can be used either to trick a victim into 
revealing confidential information, often called phishing, or to 
verify identity fraudulently when calling an institutional entity.64 
Phishers use their fraudulently gained information to transfer 
money from bank accounts, to sell credit card numbers to third 
parties, or to apply for credit cards or loans in their victim’s 
name.65 Microsoft research estimates that phishers stole over $61 
million in 2007.66  
Traditionally, phishers used spoofed websites or emails to trick 
users into entering confidential usernames and passwords.67 Now, 
phishers can also use spoofed caller ID information.68 In Sterling, 
                                                          
59 See id.   
60 See, e.g., 155 CONG. REC. S170, S173 (daily ed. Jan. 7, 2009) (statement 
of Sen. Nelson).  
61 See, e.g., Native American Methamphetamine Enforcement, The Animal 
Fighting Prohibition Enforcement Act of 2007, and the Preventing Harassment 
Through Outbound Number Enforcement (PHONE) Act of 2007: Hearing on 
H.R. 545, H.R.137, & H.R. 740 Before Subcomm. On Crime, Terrorism, & 
Homeland Sec. of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. 27 (2007) 
[hereinafter Sabin Statement] (statement of Barry Sabin, Deputy Asst. Att’y 
Gen., Criminal Div., U.S. Dep’t of Justice). 
62 See, e.g., 156 CONG. REC. H2522, H2524 (daily ed. Apr. 14, 2010) 
(statement of Rep. Stearns). 
63 See generally 2 RICHARD RAYSMAN & PETER BROWN, COMPUTER LAW: 
DRAFTING AND NEGOTIATING FORMS § 15.05 (2010). 
64 Id. 
65 Jeremy Feigelson & Camille Calman, Liability for the Costs of Phishing 
and Information Theft, 13 no. 10 J. INTERNET L., Apr. 2010, at 16.  
66 Id. at 17. 
67 RAYSMAN & BROWN, supra note 63. 
68 S. REP. NO. 110-234, at 1–2 (2007). 
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Michigan, for example, residents received phone calls appearing to 
originate from the local courthouse.69 Victims were told they had 
“missed jury duty” and they would be arrested if they did not 
immediately provide their Social Security number.70  
Caller ID spoofing is also used to fraudulently verify identity to 
gain access to confidential accounts.71 For example, Western 
Union has proceeded with cash transfers after credit card thieves 
spoofed the credit card holder’s caller ID information, making the 
call appear to have been placed by the individual whose identity 
was stolen.72  
Voicemail hacking is another example of fraudulently 
verifying identity.73 Many voicemail companies provide users 
access to their mailbox via caller ID verification without requiring 
a password.74 This security flaw was famously exposed in 2006, 
when SpoofCard75 suspended over fifty accounts, including 
socialite Paris Hilton’s, because of suspected voicemail hacking 
activity.76 Notwithstanding the account suspensions, the Los 
Angeles District Attorney investigated voicemail hacking in 2008 
after receiving complaints.77 Ultimately, SpoofCard’s parent 
company agreed to a permanent injunction, requiring that it may 
no longer advertise that it is “legal in all 50 states, if that is not the 
                                                          
69 Id. 
70 Id. 
71 See, e.g., 155 CONG. REC. S170, S173 (daily ed. Jan. 7, 2009) (statement 
of Sen. Nelson). 
72 S. REP. NO. 110-234, at 2.  
73 See Tom Gilroy, Software Firm, Two Cell Phone Providers Settle DA’s 
Allegations of Illegal ‘Spoofing,’ 9 COMPUTER TECH. L. REP. (BNA) 616 (Dec. 
19, 2008). 
74 Id. 
75 Spoofcard is the largest spoofing company, with over three million 
customers. Thomas, supra note 29. 
76 Robert McMillan, Paris Hilton Accused of Voice-Mail Hacking, 
INFOWORLD (Aug. 25, 2006), http://www.infoworld.com/d/security-central/ 
paris-hilton-accused-voice-mail-hacking-457. Many gossip columns reported 
that Hilton used the technology to hack into actress Lindsay Lohan’s voicemail, 
although Hilton’s spokesman denied the allegations. Id. 
77 Gilroy, supra note 73.  
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case . . . .”78 In addition, T-Mobile and AT&T were enjoined from 
advertising that pin-free voicemail access was a secure method of 
verification.79 Despite these efforts, voicemail hacking still 
occurs.80 In April 2010, the former publicity director for Dolce & 
Gabbana, Ali Wise, faced up to four years in prison but instead 
pleaded guilty to hacking into at least four people’s voicemail 
accounts, listening to and deleting their messages.81 
ii. Swatting 
Swatting occurs when a spoofed call is placed to an emergency 
number.82 The caller claims that an emergency is taking place at 
the location of the spoofed number.83 This process is known as 
swatting because the goal is to cause the deployment of a SWAT 
team to the location from which the call appears to originate.84 In 
2009, for example, police caught a group of men who had prank 
called over sixty cities, claiming that hostage situations were in 
progress.85 The scheme cost the cities over $250,000 in emergency 
response expenses, claimed over 250 victims, and injured two.86  
Emergency service prank calls have serious implications. The 
calls can overload the emergency response system itself, and can 
prevent police officers from responding to legitimate calls.87 
                                                          
78 Id. 
79 Id. 
80 Laura Italiano, PR Princess Ali Wise Pleads Guilty to Felony Charge, 
N.Y. POST, Apr. 29, 2010, http://www.nypost.com/p/news/local/manhattan/ 
charge_princess_ali_wise_agrees_NQ0hSsbdOjUH4cA4n0mLkO. 
81 Id. Ms. Wise hacked into one victim’s voicemail over 337 times. Id.  
82 Steve La, Prank Calls to SWAT No Joke to L.A. County Sheriffs, LA 
WEEKLY BLOGS (Aug. 30, 2010, 12:10 PM), http://blogs.laweekly.com/informer 
/2010/08/prank_calls_to_swat_is_no_joke.php. 
83 Id. 
84 Guadalupe Santana Martinez Sentencing Press Release, U.S. DEP’T OF 
JUSTICE (Mar. 12, 2008), http://www.justice.gov/usao/txn/PressRel08/martinez_ 
guadalupe_swat_sen_pr.html. 
85 Thomas, supra note 29. 
86 Id. 
87 See Deanna Lambert, County Sees Increase in Kids’ Prank 911 Calls, 
WSMV-TV (Dec. 31, 2009, 10:31 PM), http://www.wsmv.com/news/22094768/ 
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Moreover, some jurisdictions have a policy that police must 
investigate every serious call placed to 911,88 and some 
jurisdictions treat every call received as an emergency.89 Anytime 
the police respond to an emergency, first responders race to reach 
the scene as quickly as possible, placing the lives of those in the 
community, as well as the responders themselves, in danger.90 
iii. Harassment 
Many commercial caller ID spoofing companies claim they are 
intended for entertainment via prank calls to friends, but the 
service is often used to prank call strangers or make threatening 
and demeaning calls to enemies.91 Caller ID spoofing can aid 
harassers and stalkers by tricking a victim into answering a call.92 
In 2009, for example, a man called three women in the middle of 
the night claiming that he was inside their houses watching them.93 
He called the women’s cell phones and spoofed their home 
numbers so that his victims believed he was calling from within 
                                                          
detail.html.  
88 Id. 
89 See Hailee Lampert, Two Charged After Prank 911 Calls, WLKY.COM 
(Feb. 26, 2010, 7:50 AM), http://www.wlky.com/r/22677032/detail.html.  
90 I-Team: Prank 911 Calls Endanger Residents, Police, WBALTV.COM 
(July 30, 2009, 8:25 AM), http://www.wbaltv.com/r/20214644/detail.html. A 
Baltimore policeman stated, “[e]very time we drive lights-and-siren, that raises 
the potential of harm to the officers themselves and other motorists on the road, 
for accidents. It poses a very significant risk to public safety.” Id. In Texas, a 
fire engine, worth an estimated $450,000, flipped over while responding to a 
prank 911 call, injuring four firefighters. Michael N. Marcus, 911 Prank Call 
Injures Four Firefighters, 911 WACKOS (Feb. 3, 2008, 5:31 AM), 
http://911wackos.blogspot.com/2008/02/911-prank-call-injures-four.html. 
91 See PHONEGANGSTER.COM, http://www.phonegangster.com/ (last visited 
Feb. 4, 2011) (claiming their services are intended for “fun”); see also Real 
Stories/Uses, SPOOFCARD, http://www.spoofcard.com/stories (last visited Feb. 
4, 2011) (advertising testimonials from satisfied customers who were able to use 
the service to trick their friends). 
92 Sabin Statement, supra note 61. 
93 Women Terrorized by Calls Appearing to Come From Home, NBC 
PHILA. (Dec. 17, 2008, 7:45 AM), http://www.nbcphiladelphia.com/news/ 
local-beat/Women-Terrorized-By-Calls-Appearing-To-Come-From-Home.html.  
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the house.94  
iv. Political Harassment 
Legitimate political “robocalling” is “one of the most-used 
political campaign tools.”95 However, Congress is concerned about 
the increasing use of political robocalls made with the intent to 
trick voters or prevent them from voting.96 Caller ID spoofing is 
abused to make it appear that one candidate is placing a phone call, 
when in fact his opponent is using the call to annoy or confuse 
voters.97 This happened to democrat Scott Kleeb, who ran to 
represent the 3rd District of Nebraska in the U.S. House of 
Representatives in 2006.98 Automated calls were placed with 
spoofed caller ID information, making it look as if Kleeb’s 
campaign placed the phone calls.99 Voters received the calls 
overnight and sometimes repeatedly.100 Mr. Kleeb is not the lone 
victim of this strategy. In South Carolina, police arrested a local 
Republican for purportedly organizing spoofed political 
robocalls.101 Spoofing made the calls appear to be from the 
democratic candidate’s office.102 
                                                          
94 Id. 
95 Jason C. Miller, Note, Regulating Robocalls: Are Automated Calls the 
Sound of, or a Threat to, Democracy?, 16 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 
213, 215 (2009). 
96 153 CONG. REC. E1286 (daily ed. June 13, 2007) (statement of Rep. 
Green). Automated phone call devices can place as many as 100,000 calls in one 
hour. Miller, supra note 95, at 215. One automated phone call company reports 
they are able to call “10 to 20 percent of the U.S. population on a single day.” 
Id. at 216. 
97 Spoofer Calls Don’t Leave Folks Laughing, LINCOLN J. STAR, June 11, 
2007, http://journalstar.com/news/opinion/editorial/article_3ce5eb06-803355b4-
8151-be15654b2315.html. 
98 Id. 
99 Id. 
100 Id. 
101 Karen Daily, Charges Brought in Robocall Case, AIKEN STANDARD, 
Dec. 16, 2008, http://www.aikenstandard.com/local/1216Allen. 
102 Id. The woman was charged with unlawful use of a telephone under 
state law. Id. 
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There is anecdotal evidence that spoofed robocalls are effective 
at motivating voters to change their vote.103 For example, in New 
Hampshire, the National Republican Congressional Committee 
placed repetitive robocalls, late at night, designed to appear to be 
from the democratic candidate.104 The local newspaper printed a 
letter from an angry voter who stated she would not vote for the 
democratic candidate due to the annoying calls.105  
III. STATE AND FEDERAL LEGISLATIVE APPROACHES 
Increased concern over the damage caused by illegitimate uses 
of caller ID spoofing technology has triggered legislative responses 
at both the state and the federal level.106 Four states have passed 
anti-spoofing legislation.107 Congress considered six different 
versions of the Truth in Caller ID Act and three different versions 
of the Preventing Harassment Through Outbound Number 
Enforcement Act since 2006.108 This section discusses the viability 
of the states’ approaches to anti-spoofing legislation and introduces 
the federal legislation. 
                                                          
103 Miller, supra note 95, at 221. 
104 Id. These calls did not use caller ID spoofing; rather, it was the content 
of the calls that was misleading. Id. 
105 Id. 
106 156 CONG. REC. H2522, H2523 (daily ed. Apr. 14, 2010) (statement of 
Rep. Boucher); 152 CONG. REC. S3422, S3423 (daily ed. Apr. 24, 2006) 
(statement of Sen. Bill Nelson). 
107 Louisiana, Mississippi, Florida, and Oklahoma have passed anti-
spoofing legislation. See infra Part III.A. 
108  Truth in Caller ID Act of 2010, H.R. 1258, 111th Cong. (2010); Truth 
in Caller ID Act of 2009, S. 30, 111th Cong. (2009); Preventing Harassment 
Through Outbound Number Enforcement Act of 2009, H.R. 1110, 111th Cong. 
(2009); Truth in Caller ID Act of 2007, S. 704, 110th Cong. (2008); Preventing 
Harassment Through Outbound Number Enforcement Act of 2007, H.R. 740, 
110th Cong. (2007); Truth in Caller ID Act of 2007, H.R. 251, 110th Cong. 
(2007); Truth in Caller ID Act of 2006, S. 2630, 109th Cong. (2006); Preventing 
Harassment Through Outbound Number Enforcement Act, H.R. 5304, 109th 
Cong. (2006); Truth in Caller ID Act of 2006, H.R. 5126, 109th Cong. (2006). 
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A. State Legislation 
Several states have proposed or enacted anti-spoofing 
legislation.109 Louisiana’s anti-spoofing bill provides a private 
right of action and enables the district attorney to “recover a civil 
penalty”110 when “a caller . . . knowingly insert(s) false 
information into a caller identification system with the intent to 
mislead, defraud or deceive the recipient of a call.”111 Oklahoma’s 
Anti-Caller ID Spoofing Act and Mississippi’s Caller ID Anti-
Spoofing Act also outlaw the knowing falsification of caller ID 
information to mislead, defraud or deceive.112 In October 2008, 
Florida enacted the Caller ID Anti-Spoofing Act (“the Florida 
Act”), which outlawed spoofing to “deceive, defraud, or 
mislead.”113 By using the term “mislead,” these statutes have the 
practical effect of outlawing all caller ID spoofing and rejecting the 
concept of legitimate uses.114 Since the essence of caller ID 
spoofing is the ability to mislead called parties about the 
originating phone number, all uses become illegal under these 
statutes.115 
In 2008, Teltech Systems, Inc.116 filed a complaint alleging, 
among other things, that the Florida Act violated the Commerce 
Clause.117 The Southern District of Florida agreed and granted 
                                                          
109 Stolar & Gall, supra note 12. 
110 LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 51:1741.5 (West 2010). 
111 Id. § 51:1741.4. 
112 MISS. CODE ANN. § 77-3-805 (West 2010); OKL. STAT. tit. 15, § 776.23 
(West 2010). In 2009, Idaho considered, but ultimately did not enact, a similar 
anti-spoofing bill. Anti-Caller ID Spoofing Act, S. 1051, 60th Leg., Reg. Sess. 
(Idaho 2009), http://www.legislature.idaho.gov/legislation/2009/S1051.pdf. 
113 FLA. STAT. § 817.487 (West 2010). 
114 Plaintiff’s Statement of Material Facts in Support of Motion for 
Summary Judgment, supra note 49, at 2. 
115 Id. 
116 See supra note 48 (discussing Teltech). 
117 Plaintiff’s Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion for Summary 
Judgment at 17–19 Teltech Sys., Inc. v. McCollum, No. 08-61664-CIV-
Martinez-Brown (S.D. Fla. July 16, 2009) (citing Pike v. Bruce Church, 397 
U.S. 137 (1970)).  
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Teltech’s motion for summary judgment.118 Teltech argued that 
because of cellular phones and VoIP services, it could not know 
the location of the called parties.119 For example, if a Teltech client 
in New York spoofed a call to a California number, the called 
party could be in fact located in Florida, rendering the New York 
client liable under the Florida Act.120 Thus, Teltech argued it could 
not conduct its business in any state without fear of violating the 
Florida Act.121 The court concluded that the Florida Act had “the 
practical effect of regulating commerce that occurs wholly outside 
the state of Florida” in violation of the Commerce Clause.122  
Notwithstanding Teltech, states have continued to pass 
legislation similar to the Florida Act.123 It is likely these statutes 
will be challenged in federal court,124 but the outcome is unclear. 
In 2005, the U.S. Supreme Court denied certiorari on an appeal 
from a Washington state court ruling that a Washington anti-email 
spoofing statute, similar in effect to the Florida act, did not violate 
the Commerce Clause.125 The Florida court did not find this 
persuasive in Teltech, but other Districts might.126 The 
constitutional uncertainty of the existing state anti-spoofing 
                                                          
118  See Teltech, No. 08-61664-CIV-Martinez-Brown. 
119 Plaintiff’s Statement of Material Facts in Support of Motion for 
Summary Judgment, supra note 49, at 4. Likewise, simply blocking Florida area 
codes would not be sufficient to guarantee that no calls went into or originated 
in Florida. Id. at 5. 
120 Teltech, No. 08-61664-CIV-Martinez-Brown, at 16. 
121 Id. 
122 Id. 
123 See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 51:1741.4 (West 2010); MISS. CODE ANN. § 
77-3-805 (West 2010).  
124 E-mail from Mark Del Bianco, Counsel, Teltech Sys., Inc., to author 
(Nov. 30, 2010, 10:04 AM) (on file with author). In November of 2010, Teltech 
filed a constitutional challenge to the Mississippi Caller ID Anti-Spoofing Act in 
the Southern District of Mississippi. Id. 
125 Heckel v. Washington, 24 P.3d 404 (Wash. 2001), cert. denied, 534 
U.S. 997 (2001). 
126 See Teltech, No. 08-61664-CIV-Martinez-Brown; see generally 
Defendant’s Response in Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary 
Injunction at 5 Teltech, No. 08-61664-CIV-Martinez-Brown, 2009 WL 
1614869. 
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statutes, in addition to the small number of states that have enacted 
legislation, indicate that uniform and comprehensive regulation of 
caller ID spoofing must be accomplished at the federal level.  
B. Federal Legislation 
1. The Truth in Caller ID Act of 2009 
On April 6, 2006, the long journey of the Truth in Caller ID 
Acts began.127 Despite six attempts to pass this legislation, three in 
the House and three in the Senate,128 the TICIDA did not pass both 
chambers until December 15, 2010.129 On December 22, 2010, 
President Barack Obama signed the bill and it became Public Law 
111-331.130 The TICIDA amends section 227 of the 
Communications Act of 1934 (“the Act”), Title 47 of the U.S. 
Code, to outlaw certain uses of caller ID spoofing.131  
The TICIDA forbids any person “to cause any caller 
identification service to knowingly transmit misleading or 
inaccurate caller identification information with the intent to 
defraud, cause harm, or wrongfully obtain anything of 
value . . . .”132 Caller ID service is defined as “any service or 
device designed to provide the user of the service or device with 
the telephone number of, or other information regarding the 
origination of, a call made using a telecommunications service or 
IP-enabled voice service.”133  
                                                          
127  Truth in Caller ID Act of 2006, H.R. 5126, 109th Cong. (2006).  
128  Truth in Caller ID Act of 2010, H.R. 1258, 111th Cong. (2010); Truth 
in Caller ID Act of 2009, S. 30, 111th Cong. (2009); Truth in Caller ID Act of 
2007, S. 704, 110th Cong. (2008); Truth in Caller ID Act of 2007, H.R. 251, 
110th Cong. (2007); Truth in Caller ID Act of 2006, H.R. 5126, 109th Cong 
(2006); Truth in Caller ID Act of 2006, S. 2630, 109th Cong. (2006). 
129 Id. 
130 Library of Congress, Bill Summary & Status, THOMAS, http://www. 
thomas.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d111:s.00030: (last visited Feb. 4, 2011). 
131 S. 30. 
132 Truth in Caller ID Act of 2009, 47 U.S.C.A. § 227(e)(1) (West 2010).  
133 § 227(e)(8)(B). Accordingly, the TICIDA regulates VoIP calls, as well 
as traditional phone calls. § 227(e)(1). 
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Generally, a willful and knowing initial violation of the Act is 
punishable by “a fine of not more than $10,000 or imprisonment 
for a term not exceeding one year, or both . . . .”134 A second 
offense is punishable “by a fine of not more than $10,000 or by 
imprisonment for a term not exceeding two years, or both.”135 The 
TICIDA provides the FCC with enforcement power;136 however, if 
the FCC determines that criminal prosecution is warranted, then it 
shall notify the United States Attorney, who shall bring the 
appropriate charges in the proper court.137 Within six months, the 
FCC is to “prescribe regulations to implement” the TICIDA’s 
provisions138 and report to Congress “whether additional 
legislation is necessary to prohibit the provision of inaccurate 
caller identification information in technologies that are successor 
or replacement technologies to telecommunications or IP-enabled 
voice service.”139 
The TICIDA provides specific civil and criminal penalties.140 
A specific civil forfeiture penalty, in addition to the general 
penalty under the Act, is “not to exceed $10,000 for each violation, 
or three times that amount for each day of continuing 
violation . . . .”141 In contrast, a specific criminal fine under the 
TICIDA, of “not more than $10,000 for each violation, or three 
times that amount for each day of continuing violation,” is “in 
lieu” of the general fines imposed under the Act.142 However, the 
general criminal penalties under the Act, of imprisonment or a 
penalty of both fine and imprisonment, may be imposed in addition 
to the specific criminal fine.143 Lastly, the TICIDA authorizes 
independent state enforcement via civil action in federal district 
                                                          
134 Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C.A. § 501 (West 2010). 
135 Id. 
136 § 227(e)(3)(A). 
137 Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C.A. § 401 (West 2010). 
138 § 227(e)(3)(A). 
139 § 227(e)(4). 
140 See § 227(e)(5).  
141 § 227(e)(5)(A). 
142 § 227(e)(5)(B). Criminal penalties are imposed for “willful and knowing 
violation” of the TICIDA. Id. 
143 Id. 
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court.144 After the FCC receives notice of the proceeding, it may, 
however, intervene in the state action.145  
2. Past Proposals for Federal Legislation 
The Preventing Harassment through Outbound Number 
Enforcement Act (“PHONE Act”) was an alternative approach to 
caller ID spoofing regulation proposed in the House.146 There have 
been three House versions of the PHONE Act, of which the first 
was introduced in 2006.147 The most recent version, the PHONE 
Act of 2009, passed the House on December 16, 2009, with a 
resounding 418 “yeas” to one “nay,”148 yet the bill died in the 
Senate.149 Unlike the TICIDA, which amends Title 47 of the U.S. 
Code, the PHONE Act would have amended Title 18 by adding 
section 1041, “Caller ID Spoofing.”150 Section 1041(a) proposed to 
outlaw:  
                                                          
144 § 227(e)(6)(A). The TICIDA provides:  
[t]he chief legal officer of a State, or any other State officer authorized 
by law to bring actions on behalf of the residents of a State, may bring 
a civil action, as parens patriae, on behalf of the residents of the State in 
the appropriate district court . . . to impose the civil penalties for 
violation of this subsection.  
Id. 
145 § 227(e)(6)(C). 
146  Preventing Harassment Through Outbound Number Enforcement Act 
of 2009, H.R. 1110, 111th Cong. (2009). The most recent version, the PHONE 
Act, passed the House on December 16, 2009. Library of Congress, Bill 
Summary & Status, THOMAS, http://www.thomas.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/D?d 
111:2:./temp/~bdq2yI::|/home/LegislativeData.php?n=BSS;c=111|, (last visited 
Feb. 4, 2011). There have been three House versions of the PHONE Act, of 
which the first was introduced in 2006. H.R. 1110; Preventing Harassment 
Through Outbound Number Enforcement Act of 2007, H.R. 740, 110th Cong. 
(2007); Preventing Harassment Through Outbound Number Enforcement Act, 
H.R. 5304, 109th Cong. (2006).  
147 H.R. 1110; H.R. 740; H.R. 5304. 
148  Library of Congress, Bill Summary & Status, THOMAS, http://www. 
thomas.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/D?d111:2:./temp/~bdq2yI::|/home/LegislativeData. 
php?n=BSS;c=111|, (last visited Feb. 4, 2011). 
149 Id.  
150 H.R. 1110. 
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knowingly [using] or [providing] to another (1) false caller 
ID information with intent wrongfully to obtain anything of 
value; or (2) caller ID information pertaining to an actual 
person or other entity without that person’s or entity’s 
consent and with intent to deceive any person or other 
entity about the identity of the caller . . . .151 
A violation of subsection (a)(1) would have been punishable by 
a “[fine] under this title or imprison[ment] not more than 5 years, 
or both . . . .”152 A violation of subsection (a)(2) would have been 
punishable by the same terms but with a one year maximum term 
of imprisonment.153 In addition, any person convicted under 
section 1041 would have been subject to forfeiture of “(A) any 
property, real or personal, constituting or traceable to gross 
proceeds obtained from such offense; and (B) any equipment, 
software or other technology used or intended to be used to 
commit or to facilitate the commission of such offense . . . .”154 
IV. THE TRUTH IN CALLER ID ACT OF 2009 DOES NOT SOLVE THE 
PROBLEMS ASSOCIATED WITH ILLEGITIMATE CALLER ID SPOOFING 
Although the TICIDA specifically outlaws illegitimate uses of 
caller ID spoofing, such legislation does not sufficiently respond to 
the issues caused by the continued availability of the technology. 
The TICIDA’s weaknesses will encourage illegitimate users, thus 
undermining those who seek to use caller ID spoofing for valid 
purposes. Further response is necessary because caller ID spoofing 
provides valuable and legitimate services to society that ought to 
be preserved, as Congress repeatedly recognized during floor 
debates on the TICIDA.155  
                                                          
151 Id. 
152 Id. 
153 Id. 
154 H.R. 1110 §§ (d)(1)(A)–(B). 
155 See, e.g., 156 CONG. REC. H8378 (daily ed. Dec 15, 2010) (statement of 
Rep. Engel) (“I introduced the bill [inter alia] to protect legitimate uses of caller 
ID technology.”); 156 CONG. REC. H2522 (daily ed. Apr. 14, 2010); Cerasale 
Statement, supra note 46; 152 CONG. REC. H9192, H9193 (daily ed. Dec. 8, 
2006) (statement of Rep. Scott). 
HATFIELD - FINAL.DOC 5/9/2011  4:15 PM 
848 JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY 
For many legitimate users, caller ID spoofing is the best way to 
keep caller ID private since the development of two new services 
has severely limited the effectiveness of *67 blocking.156 One of 
these services is anonymous call rejection.157 This service 
intercepts incoming calls from blocked or private numbers, which 
prevents the phone from ringing and instead notifies the caller that 
the number dialed does not receive anonymous calls.158 This is 
problematic for domestic violence shelters and victims because 
courts sometimes order domestic violence victims to maintain 
contact with their ex-spouse to facilitate child custody 
arraignments.159 If an abuser utilizes anonymous call rejection, 
caller ID spoofing becomes an indispensible tool for ensuring 
contact while protecting the location of the victim.160  
The second new service is TrapCall.161 This controversial 
service reveals blocked phone numbers, which raises privacy 
concerns for legitimate users.162 When a TrapCall subscriber 
receives a blocked call, he can reject it.163 TrapCall then re-routes 
the incoming call to an 800 number, revealing the caller’s ANI.164 
The call is then sent back to the TrapCall subscriber’s mobile 
phone with the private number displayed on the subscriber’s caller 
                                                          
156 Knight Statement, supra note 26, at 23.  
157 Id. 
158 Fact Sheet 19: Caller ID and My Privacy, PRIVACY RIGHTS 
CLEARINGHOUSE, http://www.privacyrights.org/fs/fs19-cid.htm#18 (last visited 
Feb. 4, 2011). 
159 Elizabeth Olson, A Technological Boost to the Cat-and-Mouse Game 
Between Callers and the Called, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 14, 2009, http://www.ny 
times.com/2009/03/15/us/15call.html?_r=2. 
160 S. REP. NO. 110-234, at 2 (2007). 
161 Olson, supra note 159. Teltech launched TrapCall in 2009. Id. The 
service is currently available to AT&T, Verizon Wireless, Sprint, and T-Mobile 
subscribers as a free download. Frequently Asked Questions, TRAPCALL, 
http://www.trapcall.com/faq (last visited Feb. 4, 2011). 
162 Olson, supra note 159. It is argued that the service increases privacy and 
prevents harassment by allowing individuals to know the identity of callers. Id. 
163 Id. 
164 Id. While the call is re-routed, the caller continues to hear normal 
ringing. Id. See supra Part II.A for an explanation of ANI. 
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ID.165 Caller ID spoofing is the only way to prevent TrapCall from 
revealing a private number since spoofing alters both the CPN and 
the ANI, protecting the private caller’s information.166 
Notwithstanding the important privacy gains caller ID spoofing 
provides, the grave personal and public costs of illegitimate uses 
require a comprehensive federal response. The TICIDA fails to 
provide this.167 Unfortunately, if the TICIDA fails to curb 
illegitimate uses, Congress might decide to amend the TICIDA to 
adopt the states’ approach of caller ID regulation, banning the 
technology outright.  
In order to cure the deficiencies of the TICIDA and maintain 
the viability of caller ID spoofing, the Department of Justice, 
Congress, and the FCC should take a number of additional steps. 
First, federal prosecutors should creatively prosecute illegitimate 
users by charging the spoofer with the federal crime that best fits 
the illegitimate activities and provides the highest level of 
deterrence. Second, the FCC should notify Congress that text 
message caller ID spoofing will become a successor technology if 
Congress does not amend the TICIDA to define the term “call” as 
voice and text calls. Last, the FCC should enact regulations to 
facilitate law enforcement tracing of spoofed calls and create a Do-
Not-Spoof list.  
A. The Department of Justice Should Use Creative Prosecution 
Methods to Enhance Deterrence  
During floor debates on the TICIDA, Congress members 
complained that spoofers could use the service legally to realize 
illegitimate ends.168 Thus, it was argued, the TICIDA’s criminal 
proscriptions were necessary to close that gap.169 While the 
TICIDA now provides a direct method for federal prosecution of 
caller ID spoofing with the intent to “defraud, cause harm, or 
                                                          
165 Olson, supra note 159. 
166 Id. 
167 See Part II.B.2 (explaining illegitimate uses).  
168 See generally 155 CONG. REC. S170, S173 (daily ed. Jan. 7, 2009) 
(statement of Mr. Nelson) (stating that many believe that this service is legal). 
169 Id. at S173–174. 
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wrongfully obtain anything of value,”170 illegitimate caller ID 
spoofing was potentially prosecutable under numerous federal laws 
that provided steeper penalties than the TICIDA. The widespread 
use of caller ID spoofing technology for illegitimate ends suggests 
that effective deterrence requires vigorous and creative 
prosecution, which seeks to enhance the potential criminal 
penalties that illegitimate users face. Consequently, while 
prosecutors should charge those who use caller ID spoofing for 
swatting or political harassment under the TICIDA, for other 
illegitimate uses, it will be more effective to charge a spoofer 
under alternative federal statutes. The remainder of this section 
suggests which laws prosecutors should use when seeking to deter 
illegitimate users of caller ID spoofing, and the specific contexts in 
which these laws should be used. 
1. Fraud Prosecution Methods 
Committing fraud is generally illegal under many federal 
statutes that carry longer maximum penalties and larger maximum 
fines than the TICIDA, and those statutes should be used instead of 
the TICIDA to prosecute spoofing when appropriate.171 The facts 
of the fraudulent scheme will determine which federal law 
applies.172  
If the spoofer perpetrated fraud on a bank or financial 
institution, then the spoofer should be prosecuted under 18 U.S.C. 
§ 1344, making him subject to “a fine of not more than $100,000, 
imprison[ment] of not more than 30 years, or both.”173 Otherwise, 
the spoofer should be prosecuted under 18 U.S.C. § 1343, which 
covers wire fraud generally.174 Section 1343 provides that a party 
who “devises a scheme or artifice to defraud, or for obtaining 
money or property . . . by means of wire . . . shall be fined under 
                                                          
170 Truth in Caller ID Act of 2009, 47 U.S.C.A. § 227(e)(1) (West 2010). 
171 See generally Credit Card Fraud Act of 1984, 18 U.S.C.A. § 1029 (West 
2010); Communications Act Amendments, 1952, 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 1343, 1344 
(West 2010). 
172 See generally §§ 1029, 1343, 1344.  
173 § 1344.  
174 § 1343. 
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this title or imprisoned not more than 20 years, or both.”175  
While § 1343 should be used to prosecute interstate phishing 
schemes accomplished by spoofing,176 by its terms, it applies only 
to “communication in interstate or foreign commerce . . . .”177 
Furthermore, some courts have held that where all parties are 
residents of the same state, “all telephone calls are presumed to be 
intrastate and, absent any indication otherwise . . . wire fraud is not 
[present].”178 The TICIDA avoids this loophole since it does not 
have an interstate activity requirement.179 Yet, the maximum 
penalty under the TICIDA is drastically lower than the maximum 
penalty under § 1343, thus providing a windfull to the intrastate 
spoofer charged under the TICIDA. Consequently, intrastate 
spoofers should be charged under state wire fraud and identity theft 
statutes180 that have higher maximum penalties when available. 
If the spoofer used caller ID information as an access device to 
commit fraud, the spoofer should be prosecuted under 18 U.S.C. § 
1029.181 Section 1029(a)(1) makes it illegal to “knowingly and 
with intent to defraud produce, use, or traffic in one or more 
counterfeit access devices.”182 An access device is defined as any 
                                                          
175 Id. 
176 Black’s law dictionary defines a “scheme” as “[a]n artful plot or plan, 
[usually] to deceive others.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009).  
177 Communications Act Amendments, 1952, 18 U.S.C.A. § 1343 (West 
2010). In addition, “money or property [must] be the object of the defendant’s 
scheme to defraud.” United States v. Martin, 411 F. Supp. 2d 370, 373 
(S.D.N.Y. 2006). It is therefore possible that § 1343 does not include schemes to 
obtain personal information. Lastly, to be liable under § 1343, the use of the 
wires “must at least be ‘incident to an essential part of the scheme.’” Id. at 374 
(quoting United States v. Altman, 48 F.3d 96, 102 (2d Cir. 1995) (emphasis 
omitted)). 
178 Mathon v. Feldstein, 303 F. Supp. 2d 317, 324 (E.D.N.Y. 2004) 
(quoting McCoy v. Goldberg, 748 F. Supp. 146, 154 (S.D.N.Y. 1990)) 
(emphasis added). 
179 Truth in Caller ID Act of 2009, 47 U.S.C.A. § 227 (West 2010). 
180 Christine Mumford, Spam Gives Way to Data Breach, Phishing in 
Contest for State Legislators’ Attention, 8 COMPUTER TECH. L. REP. (BNA) 56 
(Feb. 2, 2007). 
 181 Credit Card Fraud Act of 1984, 18 U.S.C.A. § 1029 (West 2010). 
 182 § 1029(a)(1). 
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“code, account number, . . . mobile identification number, personal 
identification number, . . . or other means of account access that 
can be used . . . to obtain money, goods, services, or any other 
thing of value . . . .”183 Caller ID information is a unique number 
that the spoofer uses to obtain things of value in phishing schemes 
and in false identity verifications.184 In a phishing scheme, the 
spoofer uses caller ID to access personal information, which the 
spoofer can sell or use to obtain goods or cash.185 When it 
fraudulently verifies identity, caller ID is an account number that 
leads directly to the spoofer obtaining money, or valuable 
confidential information.186 Thus, § 1029 should be charged when 
phishers spoof false caller ID numbers to obtain things of value.  
Alternatively, if the phisher pretends to be a trusted entity, he 
can be prosecuted according to the mask he wears or the identity of 
his victims. Those who falsely assume the identity of a government 
official should be prosecuted under 18 U.S.C. § 912, which carries 
a criminal penalty of up to three years imprisonment.187 If caller ID 
spoofing is used in connection with a fraudulent telemarketing 
scheme, the spoofer should be prosecuted under 18 U.S.C. § 2326, 
which would subject him to an enhanced penalty of up to five 
years imprisonment.188 If during that scheme he victimized “ten or 
more persons over the age of 55; or targeted persons over the age 
of 55,” § 2326 provides “imprison[ment] for a term of up to 10 
                                                          
 183 § 1029(e)(1). 
184 See Plaintiff’s Statement of Material Facts in Support of Motion for 
Summary Judgment, supra note 49, at 2 (noting that the government had 
admitted “that on a telephone call the Caller ID string is akin to the identity of 
the caller”). 
185 RAYSMAN & BROWN, supra note 63. 
186 See S. REP. NO. 110-234, at 2 (2007). 
187 Major Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C.A. § 912 (West 2010).  
Whoever falsely assumes or pretends to be an officer or employee 
acting under the authority of the United States or any department, 
agency or officer thereof, and . . . in such pretended character demands 
or obtains any money, paper, document, or thing of value, shall be 
fined under this title or imprisoned not more than three years, or both. 
Id. 
188 Senior Citizens Against Marketing Scams Act of 1994, 18 U.S.C.A. § 
2326(1) (West 2010). 
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years.”189 
Finally, voicemail hacking is prosecutable under either the 
Stored Communications Act190 or the Wiretap Act191 depending on 
the actions taken by the spoofer once he accesses the voicemail 
system.192 If the spoofer merely accesses the system, then he 
should be prosecuted under the Stored Communications Act, 
which provides a maximum penalty of five years in prison.193 If 
however the spoofer also records copies of messages or deletes 
messages from the system, he has then intercepted 
communications and should be prosecuted under the Wiretap Act, 
which provides for penalties of up to five years in prison.194  
2. Swatting Prosecution Methods 
The TICIDA is the most effective method of prosecuting 
swatting. Before the TICIDA, there was no federal statute that 
outlawed spoofed 911 calls.195 However, certain states had 
                                                          
189  Senior Citizens Against Marketing Scams Act of 1994, 18 U.S.C.A. § 
2326(2) (West 2010). A Minnesota report stated that caller ID spoofing 
“provide[d] convincing support to criminals” in a fraudulent telemarketing 
lottery scheme. MINN. PUB. UTIL. COMM’N, STAFF BRIEFING PAPER, Docket No. 
P=999/C-08-1391, 1 (2010). 
190 Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, 18 U.S.C.A. § 2701 
makes it illegal to “intentionally access without authorization a facility through 
which an electronic communication service is provided” and “thereby [obtain], 
[alter], or [prevent] authorized access to a wire or electronic communication.” § 
2701(a). 
191 Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, 18 U.S.C.A. § 
2511, outlaws the interception and disclosure of wire, oral, or electronic 
communications. The section provides that any person who “intentionally 
intercepts, . . . any wire, oral, or electronic communication . . . shall be fined 
under this title or imprisoned not more than five years, or both.” Id. 
192 United States v. Smith, 155 F.3d 1051, 1058 (9th Cir. 1998) (discussing 
the complexity of both acts and determining that the best approach is one that 
determines their applicability based upon whether the defendant merely accesses 
the system or accesses and records or intercepts messages from the system). 
193 Id.; § 2701(b)(1).  
194 Smith, 155 F.3d at 1058; § 2511(4)(a).  
195 See generally Rana Sampson, Guide 19: Misuse and Abuse of 911, 
PROBLEM ORIENTED GUIDES FOR POLICE 13 (U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Office of 
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promulgated statutes that specifically outlawed fake, false, or 
fraudulent 911 calls.196 For example, in Oklahoma and Georgia, 
false 911 calls are first-degree misdemeanors.197 Rhode Island 
imposes a maximum fine of $1,000 dollars and/or a maximum 
sentence of one-year imprisonment for knowingly making false 
reports to emergency services.198 The offense became a felony in 
Illinois in response to public outcry after a police officer’s car 
flipped over as he sped to the scene of a false 911 report of five 
dead bodies.199 However, the monetary penalties under the 
TICIDA are considerably higher than under state laws. 
Consequently, prosecutors should charge swatters under the 
TICIDA.  
3. Harassment Prosecution Methods 
Congress first enacted legislation on annoying or harassing 
phone calls in 1968.200 These and other federal statutes provide 
more stringent penalties than the TICIDA, and consequently 
                                                          
Cmty. Oriented Policing Servs. Ser. No. 19, 2004), Aug. 2004, available at 
http://www.cops.usdoj.gov/files/ric/Publications/e07042423_web.pdf. 
196 There are also non-specific statutes under which swatters may be 
prosecuted. Alexis Stevens, 7th Graders Arrested After 911 Prank Calls, 
ATLANTA J.-CONST., Mar. 24, 2010, http://www.ajc.com/news/cobb/7th-
graders-arrested-after-401061.html. For example, two juveniles were charged 
with “transmission of false public alarm and disruption of a public school” after 
making prank 911 calls on school grounds. Id. In New York, a teenager was 
charged with disorderly conduct after placing prank 911 calls. Ben Muessig, 
Teen Who Made Prank 911 Call Has History of False Reports, GOTHAMIST 
(March 1, 2010, 4:57 PM), http://gothamist.com/2010/03/01/teen_who_made_ 
prank_911_call_has_hi.php. Lastly, a Kentucky man was charged with wanton 
endangerment for making a false 911 calls. Lampert, supra note 89. 
197 GA. CODE ANN. § 16-11-39.2(b) (West 2010); OKLA. STAT. tit. 63, § 
2819 (West 2010).  
198 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 39-21.1-16 (West 2010).  
199 Monique Garcia, Prank 911 Calls to Carry Stiffer Penalty, CHI. TRIB., 
July 26, 2010, http://newsblogs.chicagotribune.com/clout_st/2010/07/prank-
911-calls-to-carry-stiffer-penalty.html.  
200 SHARON K. BLACK, TELECOMMUNICATIONS LAW IN THE INTERNET AGE 
290 (Rick Adams ed., 2002). Indeed, many states have also passed laws 
criminalizing harassment via intrastate phone calls. Id. 
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should be used to prosecute harassment when applicable. Title 47, 
§ 223 of the U.S. Code prohibits “[o]bscene or harassing telephone 
calls” and violations thereunder are subject to a fine, imprisonment 
of up to two years, or both.201 Section 223(a)(1)(C) prohibits the 
use of “a telecommunications device, whether or not conversation 
or communication ensues, without [the disclosure of the caller’s] 
identity and with intent to annoy, abuse, threaten, or harass any 
person at the called number or who receives the 
communications.”202 In United States v. Bowker, the defendant was 
found guilty of telephone harassment under § 223(a)(1)(C) after he 
placed multiple unwanted calls using *67 to block his caller ID 
information.203 The defendant argued, unsuccessfully, that even 
though the caller ID information was blocked, the victim could 
recognize his voice, which meant that his identity was not actually 
concealed.204 The court held that the defendant had failed to 
disclose his real identity when he identified himself by another 
name during phone calls and voice messages.205 Thus, anytime a 
spoofer uses the technology to harass, annoy, abuse, or threaten, 
and the spoofer does not state his name during the call, he should 
be prosecuted under this section.  
Congress has also outlawed stalking via telephone calls.206 
Title 18, § 2261A(2) of the U.S. Code provides that whoever uses 
“any facility of interstate or foreign commerce to engage in a 
course of conduct that causes substantial emotional distress to [his 
victim]” with intent to harass is punishable by up to five years 
                                                          
201 Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C.A. § 223(a)(1) (West 2010).  
202 § 223(a)(1)(C). In United States v. Popa, the U.S. Court of Appeals for 
the District of Columbia defined these terms: “To annoy means to irritate, to 
bother, to make someone angry by repeated action; to abuse means to use 
insulting, coarse or bad language about or to someone; . . . and, fourth, to harass 
means to trouble, to worry or torment.” United States v. Popa, 187 F.3d 672, 674 
(D.C. Cir. 1999). 
203 See generally United States v. Bowker, 372 F.3d 365 (6th Cir. 2004).   
204 Id. at 390.  
205 Id. (holding that a receiver’s ability to “suspect, or have a very good 
idea of, the caller’s identity” is irrelevant to the question of whether the 
defendant disclosed his identity). 
206 See Safe Homes for Women Act of 1994, 18 U.S.C.A. § 2261A(2) 
(West 2010). 
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imprisonment, a fine, or both.207 In Bowker, the Sixth Circuit held 
that harassing and threatening telephone conversations and 
voicemail messages, coupled with the victim’s testimony that these 
conversations and messages made her fearful of leaving her house, 
were sufficient to uphold a conviction under § 2261A.208 Thus, a 
stalker who manipulates caller ID in order to gain access to his 
victim and causes her emotional distress should be prosecuted 
under § 2261A. 
4. Political Harassment Prosecution Methods 
The TICIDA should be charged in political harassment 
prosecutions rather than other available federal alternatives. Title 
18 U.S.C. § 241 provides that “[i]f two or more persons conspire to 
injure, oppress, threaten, or intimidate any person . . . in the free 
exercise or enjoyment of any right or privilege secured to him by 
the Constitution or law of the [United States] . . . [t]hey shall be 
fined under this title or imprisoned not more than ten years, or 
both . . . .”209 This section requires a specific intent to violate the 
victim’s constitutional rights; however, this intent need not be the 
sole intent of the conspiracy.210 Nonetheless, it might be difficult to 
prove that robocalls that merely provided false information through 
benign language intimidated or oppressed the called party. In these 
circumstances, § 241 might not be effective in this context. 
Alternatively, 42 U.S.C. § 1971(b) provides that “[n]o person, 
whether acting under color of law or otherwise, shall intimidate, 
threaten, coerce, or attempt to intimidate, threaten, or coerce any 
other person for the purpose of interfering with the right of such 
other person to vote or to vote as he may choose . . . .”211 Since 
political harassment is arguably an attempt to coerce voters, § 
1971(b) seems like an easier fit in political harassment 
prosecutions than § 241. However, § 1971(b) does not provide for 
                                                          
207 Id. 
208 See Bowker, 372 F.3d at 370. 
209 Major Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C.A. § 241 (West 2010).  
210 United States v. Ellis, 595 F.2d 154, 161–62 (3d Cir. 1979).  
211 Civil Rights Act of 1957, 42 U.S.C.A. § 1971(b) (West 2010). 
HATFIELD - FINAL.DOC 5/9/2011  4:15 PM 
 Phoney Business 857 
criminal penalties.212 Given the deficiencies of the available 
alternative methods of federal prosecution, the TICIDA should be 
utilized to prosecute political harassers who utilize caller ID 
spoofing.   
B. The FCC Should Inform Congress that Text Message 
Spoofing Will Become a Successor Technology in its 
Section (e)(4) Report213 
The TICIDA is underinclusive because it is unclear whether it 
also prohibits nefarious text message spoofing. Effective 
legislation must define “call” to include both voice and text calls. 
Text messages are “the most successful communications medium 
since e-mail,”214 and almost 90 percent of Americans use a cell 
phone.215 Text message spoofing can accomplish many of the same 
illegitimate ends as traditional caller ID spoofing, as well as other 
harms specific to the text message medium.216 If the TICIDA does 
not expressly cover text message spoofing, then illegitimate users 
might simply spoof caller ID through different means. 
Accordingly, the FCC should notify Congress in its section (e)(4) 
                                                          
212 § 1971(c). However, the Attorney General may seek a preventative 
injunction against any party for which there are reasonable grounds to anticipate 
a violation. Id. 
213 Section (e)(4) of the TICIDA provides that the FCC “shall report to 
Congress whether additional legislation is necessary to prohibit the provision of 
inaccurate caller identification information in technologies that are successor or 
replacement technologies to telecommunications service or IP-enabled voice 
service.” Truth in Caller ID Act of 2009, 47 U.S.C.A. § 227(e)(4) (West 2010). 
214 Pieter Streicher, SMS Is Not to blame, ITWEB ONLINE, July 29, 2009, 
http://www.itweb.co.za/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=2486
6:sms-is-not-to-blame&catid=143&Itemid=99 (“[Text] messages can be sent to 
more than three billion people worldwide, and in 2008, a total of six trillion 
[text] messages were sent globally.”). 
215 Press Release, Spoofem.com, Spoofem.com Uses Mobile Media for 
New Marketing Method (Aug. 4, 2010) (on file with author). In addition, 
“52,083 text messages are sent every second,” with 83% being read within one 
hour of receipt. Id. Revenue from text messaging is estimated to reach $110 
billion annually by 2013. Streicher, supra note 214.  
216 SMS Spoofing, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/SMS_spoofing 
(last visited Feb. 4, 2011).  
HATFIELD - FINAL.DOC 5/9/2011  4:15 PM 
858 JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY 
report that text message spoofing will become a successor 
technology if it is not included under the TICIDA’s prohibitions. 
As with traditional caller ID spoofing, illegitimate users exploit 
text message caller ID spoofing to harass or defraud others.217 For 
example, a Kansas court awarded $7.3 million in a harassment suit 
where the defendant sent the plaintiff and the plaintiff’s family 
“profane and defamatory text messages” using a spoofing service 
to mask her identity.218 When spoofers phish through text 
messages, it is known as “smishing.”219 In one common fraud, a 
spoofed text message informs victims that her bank account has 
been suspended.220 The message states that the victim must call an 
800 number in order to unlock her account.221 Upon dialing this 
number, a message instructs the victim to enter her debit or credit 
card account number, pin, and expiration date.222 There have also 
been reports of spoofed text messages that fool receivers into 
downloading costly programs.223 In one scheme, a cell phone user 
receives a text message that reads, “Please call the hospital, it’s 
your mother.”224 However, when the cell phone user calls the 
number in the text message, a call is placed to a premium rate 
service,225 and the user inadvertently downloads a virus that sends 
                                                          
217 Bill Meyer, Spoofing Scams Make Caller ID Untrustworthy, Can Be 
Used to Defraud, Terrify Victims, CLEVELAND.COM (Sept. 17, 2009, 1:29 PM), 
http://www.cleveland.com/nation/index.ssf/2009/09/spoofing_scams_make_call
er_id.html. 
218 Id. 
219 Smishing is a New Cyber Fraud That Uses SMS Messages, NORTHERN 
STAR (Australia), Nov. 17, 2009, at 15.  
220 Brian Krebs, Security Fix: The Anatomy of a Vishing Scam, WASH. 
POST (Mar. 15, 2008, 5:54 PM), http://voices.washingtonpost.com/security 
fix/2008/03/the_anatomy_of_a_vishing_scam_1.html; see also Smishing is a 
New Cyber Fraud That Uses SMS Messages, supra note 219. 
221 Krebs, supra note 220. 
222 Id. 
223 See generally Ed Finegold, Internet-like Services Bring Internet-like 
Crime, BILLING WORLD AND OSS TODAY, May 1, 2007, http://www. 
billingworld.com/articles/2007/05/internet-like-services-bring-internet-like-
crime.aspx. 
224 Id. 
225 Id. Premium text messages enable cell users to purchase goods billed to 
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premium text messages without the user’s knowledge.226  
The TICIDA defines “caller identification service” as 
“information provided by a caller identification service regarding 
the telephone number of, or other information regarding the 
origination of, a call made using a telecommunications service or 
IP-enabled voice service.”227 Unfortunately, the TICIDA does not 
define the term “call.”228 Of course, it is possible that the FCC or 
the courts will interpret the TICIDA to include text calls.229 Indeed, 
the FCC has interpreted the Telephone Consumer Protection Act 
(“TCPA”) to include text messages even though the statute did not 
expressly cover text messages.230 The TCPA prohibits any call 
placed to “any telephone number assigned to a paging service, 
cellular telephone service, . . . or any service for which the called 
party is charged” using an automatic dialing system or an artificial 
or prerecorded voice.231 The FCC determined that the term “call” 
under the TCPA includes voice calls and text calls, reasoning that 
the distinguishing factor was not the type of call placed, but 
whether the call was placed to a telephone number assigned to a 
pay service.232 Thus, if the FCC were to apply similar logic to the 
TICIDA, perhaps the FCC would find that the determinative factor 
is whether the caller ID information was spoofed, not whether the 
communication was made via voice or text call.  
However, federal courts are not necessarily bound to 
incorporate the same interpretation as the FCC.233 In determining 
whether to adopt an agency’s interpretation of an ambiguous 
statute, a court utilizes a two-step process outlined by the Supreme 
Court in Chevron, Inc v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 
                                                          
the cell phone bill. Id. 
226 Id. 
227 Truth in Caller ID Act of 2009, 47 U.S.C.A. § 227(e)(8) (West 2010). 
228 See id. 
229 See generally Implementing the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 
1991, 18 FCC Rcd. 14014, 14115 (2003). 
230 See id. 
231 Id. 
232 See id. 
233 Chevron, Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842 
(1984). 
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Inc.234 First, the court asks, “whether Congress has directly spoken 
to the precise question at issue.”235 Second, the court asks if the 
agency’s interpretation is reasonable.236 If these two questions are 
answered in the affirmative, “a court must defer to the federal 
agency’s interpretation of the statute . . . .”237 In Satterfield v. 
Simon & Schuster, Inc., the Ninth Circuit adopted the FCC’s 
interpretation of the term “call” under the TCPA.238 In so holding, 
the court weighed heavily on Congress’ delegation of authority to 
the FCC to implement the TCPA and the fact that “call” was 
undefined in the TCPA.239 Noting that the TCPA was enacted 
before the availability of text message technology, the court held 
that Congress could not have clearly spoken about the TCPA’s 
applicability to text calls.240 Of course, text messages were 
available before the TICIDA’s enactment, making Congress’ 
omission appear more deliberate. Accordingly, even if the FCC 
were to interpret “call” to include text calls, thereby utilizing its 
authority to implement the statute, the issue would not simply be 
settled; courts would nonetheless apply the Chevron analysis 
before deciding whether to adopt the FCC’s interpretation of the 
statute. This would render the legal status of text message spoofing 
under the TICIDA unclear once again.  
Since text message spoofing can be used to accomplish that 
which the TICIDA clearly prohibits, the TICIDA must cover text 
message spoofing to prevent illegitimate spoofers from utilizing 
this successor technology. Therefore, the FCC should notify 
Congress in its section (e)(4) report that Congress must define the 
term “call” to include text message calls expressly.  
                                                          
234 Id. 
235 Id. 
236 Id. 
237 Satterfield v. Simon & Schuster, Inc., 569 F.3d 946, 952 (9th Cir. 2009). 
238 Id.   
239 Id. at 953.  
240 Id. at 954. 
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C. The FCC Should Pass Regulations to Facilitate Law 
Enforcement Tracing and to Create a Do-Not-Spoof List 
During debates on the TICIDA and the PHONE Act, Congress 
members voiced concerns about law enforcement tracing and the 
unauthorized substitution of other individuals’ phone numbers 
during spoofed calls.241 The TICIDA does not directly address 
these concerns.242 Before the passage of the TICIDA, the FCC 
stated that its jurisdiction over caller ID spoofing companies was 
unclear.243 However, now that the TICIDA is law, the FCC must 
“pass regulations to implement [the TICIDA].”244 On January 26, 
2011, the Department of Justice requested that the FCC promulgate 
rules of this nature.245 Moreover, the legislative history shows that 
Congress intended the FCC to pass regulations “imposing 
obligations on entities that provide caller ID spoofing services to 
the public.”246 This section argues that the FCC should promulgate 
regulations to address these concerns and any others necessary to 
maintain the viability of the industry.  
1. Tracing 
During congressional debates on the TICIDA and the PHONE 
Act, representatives expressed concern about the difficulty of 
                                                          
241 Letter from Lanny A. Breuer, Assistant Atty. Gen., U.S. Dep’t of 
Justice, to Marlene H. Dortch, Sec’y, Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n (Jan. 26, 2011), 
available at http://www.telecomlawmonitor.com/uploads/file/DOJ%20Truth 
%20in%20Caller%20ID%20letter.pdf. 
242 Id. 
243 Monteith Statement, supra note 51, at 3–4. 
244 Truth in Caller ID Act of 2009, 47 U.S.C.A. § 227(e)(3)(A) (West 
2010). 
245 Letter from Lanny A. Breuer to Marlene H. Dortch, supra note 241, at 4 
(“[T]he Commission should . . . allow law enforcement to trace such calls to the 
true originating telephone number with appropriate authority.”); id. at  3 (“The 
Department of Justice shares Congress’ concern about the ready availability of 
services that allow users to spoof telephone numbers with which they have no 
association whatsoever.”). 
246 156 CONG. REC. H8378 (daily ed. Dec 15, 2010) (statement of Rep. 
Boucher).  
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tracing spoofed calls.247 When correct caller ID information is 
reported, civilians and law enforcement agencies are able to dial 
*57 to implement a tracing service that stores information about 
the caller for the use of law enforcement.248 That technology does 
not render correct information when the number is spoofed, 
making the tracing process more time-consuming.249  
Although tracing a spoofed call might be difficult, it is 
possible.250 Often, tracking down the caller requires subpoenaing 
either the commercial spoofing company or the VoIP provider.251 
Teltech reports that it “take[s] a very proactive approach to help 
law enforcement” when its service is used illegally.252 In order to 
help law enforcement trace spoofed phone calls, the FCC should 
promulgate record-keeping regulations applicable to commercial 
spoofing companies and VoIP providers. These regulations should 
specify what information must be kept by spoofing companies, the 
period of time such records must be kept, and the penalties that 
should be imposed for failure to keep such records.  
2. Do-Not-Spoof List 
Another concern voiced during the debates on the PHONE Act 
was the protection of those whose numbers are used to mask the 
identity of the spoofer.253 Often a spoofer will substitute the same 
                                                          
247 Sabin Statement, supra note 61 (discussing the difficulty police 
encountered when trying to locate the source of threatening spoofed phone calls 
made to a police officer and his family and expressing concern that spoofing 
could “complicate criminal investigations”). 
248 See Preventing Harassment Through Outbound Number Enforcement 
(PHONE) Act: Hearing on H.R. 5304 Before Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism, 
and Homeland Sec. of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 28 (2006) 
(statement of Rep. Murphy).  
249 Id. 
250 See id. 
251 Id. 
252 Meyer, supra note 217.  
253 See generally Preventing Harassment Through Outbound Number 
Enforcement (PHONE) Act: Hearing on H.R. 5304 Before Subcomm. On Crime, 
Terrorism, and Homeland Security, 109th Cong. (2006) [hereinafter Kiko 
Statement] (statement of Phil Kiko, Chief of Staff and General Counsel, U.S. 
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number repeatedly.254 This happened to Phil Kiko, Chief of Staff 
and General Counsel to the House of Representatives, who 
received upwards of twenty phone calls per day from individuals 
who believed that he was repeatedly calling them.255 Instead, a 
spoofer had placed those calls spoofing Mr. Kiko’s name.256 
Currently, those whose numbers are used to spoof have few 
options but to change their phone numbers.257  
Subsection two of the PHONE Act would have criminalized 
the use of “caller ID information pertaining to an actual person or 
other entity without that person’s or entity’s consent and with 
intent to deceive any person or other entity about the identity of the 
caller” in an apparent attempt to minimize unauthorized use of 
numbers.258 However, it is too demanding to require that everyday 
users of caller ID spoofing technology determine whether a phone 
number belongs to another individual. Any such requirement 
would likely have negative effects on legitimate users, such as 
domestic violence victims, who might chose a random string of 
numbers without realizing it is in fact another’s phone number. In 
addition, the threat of criminal sanction for failure to get approval 
to spoof a number will force these victims to use their relatives’ or 
friends’ phone numbers, which might reveal too much about their 
locations. Thus, the providers of caller ID spoofing should assume 
the responsibility for determining whether the use of a phone 
number is appropriate. 
On January 26, 2011, the Department of Justice suggested that 
the FCC “should consider the feasibility of requiring public 
providers of caller ID spoofing services to make a good-faith effort 
to verify that a user has the authority to use the substituted number, 
such as by placing a one-time verification call to that number.”259 
However, such a requirement is far too burdensome on the 
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industry. Just one public provider of caller ID spoofing services 
reported having over three million customers260 and these 
customers might have substituted more than one number each. 
Clearly, implementing such a system, which placed a phone call to 
every proposed substitute number, would require a massive 
undertaking by public providers. Moreover, the system would be 
inefficient, as repetitive calls would surely occur. 
Instead, the FCC should promulgate regulations mandating that 
commercial spoofing companies maintain a shared Do-Not-Spoof 
list. Unlike the Department of Justice’s proposed method, this list 
would prevent spoofers from substituting the listed number or 
calling listed numbers with spoofed caller ID information. 
Additionally, all caller ID companies would share the price of 
maintaining such a list, preventing the duplicate costs incurred 
under the Department of Justice’s proposed method.  
Spoofing companies already maintain lists that operate in a 
similar manner. SpoofCard reports that it maintains a list of 
numbers that spoofers cannot call.261 It created this list in an effort 
to prevent swatting and SpoofCard continually works to increase 
the list of police numbers that are not spoofable.262 In addition, 
Spoofem.com now offers SpoofAbuse, where for five dollars one 
can provide up to three numbers which the company will put on its 
do not spoof list, so its customers will no longer be able to make 
spoofed calls to that number.263 Spoofem.com also provides these 
numbers to other commercial spoofing companies; however, it 
does not guarantee that other companies will respect the 
subscriber’s request.264 Thus, the technology for a Do-Not-Spoof 
list exists, but could be used more efficiently. 
Any Do-Not-Spoof list should include emergency and 
government numbers so customers cannot engage in swatting and 
so phishers cannot spoof these numbers to trick others. Individuals 
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should be able to contact spoofing providers directly and the FCC 
should determine a method for phone service providers to report 
their customers’ requests to be added to the list.265 Lastly, the FCC 
should determine the appropriate sanctions to impose when 
companies fail to honor individuals’ requests that their numbers 
not be used for spoofing. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Caller ID spoofing provides real societal benefits, but can also 
deliver dangerous blows.266 The trust many place in their caller ID 
service gives spoofers an advantage when they commit crimes, but 
spoofing also provides necessary shelter to many legitimate 
users.267 The Truth in Caller ID Act of 2009 is a step in the right 
direction; however, additional federal response is necessary. The 
Department of Justice should utilize its full array of options to 
prosecute creatively when appropriate, so that the charge conveys 
the gravity of the crime. In addition, the TICIDA must clearly 
include text message caller ID spoofing because it is used to 
accomplish the same illegitimate ends as traditional caller ID 
spoofing. Lastly, the FCC should promulgate regulations to help 
law enforcement trace illegitimate users and create a Do-Not-
Spoof list. With a comprehensive approach, Congress will be able 
to ensure the legality of caller ID spoofing technology for 
legitimate users, while also minimizing illegitimate uses. Victims 
of caller ID spoofing, like Doug Bates, should feel safe in their 
homes again. 
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